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In Chapter 6 of IP46, vested property rights are recognised to include “copyright and 
other intellectual property rights”.1 For the purposes of the Inquiry “the ALRC 
[identified it was to consider] ‘vested property rights’ more in its broad, rhetorical 
sense, than in its technical sense, in which there are distinct shades of meaning of 
‘vested’”.2 However, the Interim Report states that any ‘vested right’ of users of 
copyright works “has not been identified yet in law”.3 It is assumed from this that the 
ALRC is proposing not to further consider the contracting out of the fair dealing 
exceptions. In light of its prior stated purpose it is submitted this is not appropriate.  
Further, it is submitted the above view regarding the fair dealing exceptions is not 
correct. In Australia there is a longstanding common law right vested upon users to 
freely access copyright works. This is reflected in the limited monopolistic rights 
currently granted by the Copyright Act 1968 to the authors and owners of copyright 
works, which are balanced by provisions specifically permitting exceptions to what 
would otherwise be infringing conduct. User’s vested rights are represented by the 
current statutory fair dealing exceptions4 but developed long before and separately 
from those provisions. The fair dealing exceptions has existed, in fact, in slightly 
different forms, in each of Australia’s three pieces of copyright legislation, which in 
turn were derived from early English law. Noting the High Court recognised the 
relationship between the first copyright law - the Statute of Anne 1709 (UK)5 (‘Statute 
of Anne’) – and today’s Act;6 the journey in fact begins before Anne.  
The precursor to the modern exceptions was ‘fair abridgment’, which was a judge-
made doctrine, that began developing in the mid-1700s to allow the printing and 
selling of condensed versions of books without infringing the copyright in that book. 
																																																								
1 ALRC IP 46: Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by Commonwealth Law, p.51. 
2 ALRC Interim Report [7.30]. 
3 ALRC Interim Report [7.95]. 
4 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss. 40-43 and 103A-104. 
5 8 Anne c 19  
6 IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 458, 471[25] per French CJ, Crennan and 
Kiefel JJ (references omitted). See also Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc v Théberge [2002] 2 SCR 
336, [30] per Binnie J. For a recent critique on this access/incentive paradigm, see Nicolas Suzor, 
‘Access, Progress, and Fairness: Rethinking Exclusivity in Copyright Law’ (2013) 15(2) Vanderbilt 
Journal of Technology and Entertainment Law 297. Anne provided: An Act for the Encouragement of 
Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during 
the Times therein mentioned. 
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An ‘abridgment’ drew its expression from the original work but was easier to read, 
and sometimes an adaptation of some sort, but often a substitute for it.7 It was first 
judicially expounded in the 1740 case of Gyles v Wilcox.8 Consistently with the 
express purpose of Anne, fair abridgments served an important public purpose: the 
dissemination of knowledge.9 The abridger enriched the public domain by expressing 
existing ideas and information through a different perspective and for a different 
purpose. This was through a ‘derivative’ form of expression presented in a condensed 
manner more palatable to and cheaper for a wider audience than the original works.10  
This dissemination of knowledge was recognised as transcending the copyright 
owner’s economic and moral interests in relation to the work.11 Indeed, often the 
abridgment itself was deserving of copyright protection.12  
The fair abridgment doctrine post-Anne was a creature of the Courts. Anne was silent 
on the legal status of abridgments, and it remains unsettled as to whether Anne was 
intended to regulate their production or not.13 Copyright then was not as well regarded 
as perhaps it may be today. When first enacted the British Parliament intended that 
Anne would restrain the publishing industry and its historical monopolistic power by 
decentralisation.14 Copyright thus was a mechanism for trade regulation and not to be 
interpreted too broadly;15 a view, which dominated copyright policymaking until the 
early 20th Century.16  Indeed, not only was the grant of the monopoly much more 
restricted than today, as it was confined to the exclusive rights of printing and selling, 
Anne was not a code as it was not considered an exhaustive statement of the law.17 
Fair abridgment continued as a right until the 1860s.18  
																																																								
7 David Vaver, ‘Abridgements and Abstracts: Copyright Implications’ (1995) 17(5) European 
Intellectual Property Review 225. 
8 (1740) 26 ER 489.  
9 Matthew Sag, ‘The Prehistory of Fair Use’ (2011) 76(4) Brooklyn Law Review 1371, 1384-5. 
10 See e.g., Strahan v Newbery (1774) Lofft 775; 98 ER 913, 913-14 per Lord Chancellor Aspley:  
11 Jane Ginsburg, ‘“Une chose publique”? The author’s domain and the public domain in early British, 
French and US copyright law’ (2006) 65(3) Cambridge Law Journal 636, 648. See also the remarks of 
de Grey J in the famous Donaldson v Beckett litigation, cited in Stephen Parks (ed), The Literary 
Property Debate: Six Tracts 1764-1774 (Garland Publishing, 1975) 46. 
12 Richard Godson, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Patents for Inventions and of Copyright 
(Saunders & Benning, 1832) 238. 
13 See Ronan Deazley, ‘The Statute of Anne and the Great Abridgement Swindle’ (2010) 47(4) 
Houston Law Review 793. There are, however, some with more definitive views: see Alexandra Sims, 
‘Appellations of piracy: fair dealing’s prehistory’ (2011) 1 Intellectual Property Quarterly 3, 7 (noting 
Anne was passed in full knowledge of the continuing prevalence of abridgements in the book trade’). 
14 B Khan, Intellectual Property and Economic Development: Lessons from American and European 
History (London, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002) 33-34; Marci Hamilton, 
‘Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright’ (1996) 14 Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal 655, 659. 
15 Lyman Ray Patterson and Stanley W Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users’ Rights 
(University of Georgia Press, 1991) 28-29. 
16 Benedict Atkinson, The True History of Copyright: The Australian Experience 1905-2005 (Sydney 
University Press, 2007) 256-57. 
17 Sims, above n 13, 4. 
18 Tinsley v Lacy (1863) 1 H & M 747; 71 ER 327, 330. 
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During the 19th Century there developed bodies of jurisprudence, which sanctioned 
other third party uses of copyright works – being review, criticism and (later) fair 
use.19   The word ‘review’ appears to have arisen first in in the 1807 decision of 
Roworth v Wilkes.20 ‘Criticism’ appeared a decade later in the decision in 
Whittingham v Wooler.21 At the close of the 19th Century reviews were recognised as 
a necessary aspect of the book trade. As such, ‘fair review’ (or ‘fair criticism’) as an 
exception had cemented its place in the copyright regime.22 Towards the end of the 
19th Century, the notion of ‘fair use’ also had developed.  Bowrey argues that the case 
of Sayres v Moore23 captures its birth.24 While others, such as Patry, argue that Cary v 
Kearsley25 takes that mantle.26 The term ‘fair dealing’ is uniquely Antipodean. 
Australia was in fact the first common law country to employ the term ‘fair dealing’ 
in statutory reference to permitted third party uses of a copyrighted work. Section 28 
of the Copyright Act 1905 (Cth) (‘1905 Act’), Australia’s first federal copyright law, 
provided in broad terms: 
Copyright in a book shall not be infringed by a person making an abridgement or translation of the 
book for his private use (unless he uses it publicly or allows it to be used publicly by some other 
person), or by a person making fair extracts from or otherwise fairly dealing with the contents 
of the book for the purpose of a new work, or for the purposes of criticism, review, or 
refutation, or in the ordinary course of reporting scientific information. (emphasis added) 
Section 28 was intended to restate the common law as developed in 18th and 19th 
Century England.27 It clearly distinguished between fair dealings that resulted in the 
creation of a ‘new work’, and those that were for certain purposes: criticism, review 
																																																								
19 In the early 18th Century, the courts also referred to ‘fair quotations’ as permitted uses of copyright-
protected material: see Wilkins v Aikin (1810) 34 ER 163, 164 per Lord Eldon; Mawman v Tegg (1826) 
38 ER 380, 384 per Lord Eldon.  
20 (1807) 170 ER 889; 1 Camp 94. It is, however, noteworthy that ‘review’ and ‘criticism’ appeared in 
argument by counsel, before the courts adopted such terminology: see e.g., Macklin v Richardson 
(1770) 27 ER 451; Amb 694, 696 and Roworth v Wilkes (1807) 170 ER 889; 1 Camp 94, 97. 
21 (1817) 2 Swans 428; 36 ER 679. 
22 Chatterton v Cave (1878) 3 AC 483, 492 (‘Books are published with an expectation, if not a desire, 
that they will be criticised in reviews, and if deemed valuable that parts of them will be used as 
affording illustrations by way of quotation, or the like--and if the quantity taken be neither substantial 
nor material, if, as it has been expressed by some judges, ‘a fair use’ only be made of the publication, 
no wrong is done and no action can be brought.’). 
23 (1785) 102 ER 139 
24 Kathy Bowrey, ‘On Clarifying the role of originality and fair use in 19th century UK jurisprudence: 
appreciating ‘the humble grey which emerges as the result of long controversy’ [2008] University of 
New South Wales Law Research Series 58.   
25 (1803) 4 Esp 168. 
26 William Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law (The Bureau of National Affairs Inc, 1985) 
3; while others, such as Sims, argue that Cary v Kearsley had nothing to do with fair use or fair 
dealing, but, instead, the question of whether the defendant’s reproduction was a new and original 
work: Sims, above n 14, 21. In any event, while the use of the expression ‘fair use’ had solidified after 
Vice Chancellor Wood handed down judgments in Jarrold v Houlston 3 K & J 708, 714-15 (1857) and 
Scott v Stanford LR 3 Eq 718, 722 (1867), the term would not find its way into the Copyright Act 1911 
(UK), and nor into Australia’s copyright laws. 
27 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 28 September 1905, 2912 (John Keating). 
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or refutation. In other words, it recognised that allowing fair dealings with a work was 
concerned with at least two aims: providing enough ‘breathing space’ for future 
authors; and promoting specific uses of works that, regardless of whether they were 
deserving of authorship, were socially-valuable. 
In 1912 Australia then ‘adopted’ the Copyright Act 1911 (UK) (‘1911 Act’) by 
incorporating its provisions into the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) (‘1912 Act’).28 In many 
respects, the 1912 Act was a very different to the 1905 Act it replaced,29 as seen in the 
fair dealing provision in section 2(1), which provided: 
The following … shall not constitute the infringement of a copyright (i) any fair dealing with any 
work for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper summary. 
The protections granted to fair abridgement by Section 28 of the 1905 Act were not 
replicated in the 1912 Act. However, As Viscount Haldane noted, Section 2(1) was 
intended to codify the body of common law principles the courts had developed “with 
the greatest care” in relation to fair reviews and other fair uses.30  The replacement of 
the 1912 Act with the 1968 Act31 saw limited change as fair dealing was re-enacted in 
substantively the same form. The ‘new’ fair dealing provisions covered essentially the 
same kinds of uses as prescribed under the 1912 Act: research or private study,32 
criticism or review,33 and news reporting.34 The only substantive changes were the 
																																																								
28 See Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) s 8. By virtue of s 25(1) of the Copyright Act 1911 (UK), the 1911 Act 
applied throughout the dominions of the British Empire. As such, the High Court of Australia later held 
that the 1911 Act applied in Australia by force of Imperial law, rather than by virtue of any law enacted 
by the Commonwealth parliament supported by s 51(xviii) of the Australian Constitution: Gramophone 
Co Ltd v Leo Feist Incorporated (1928) 41 CLR 1. As Hansard reports, the 1911 Act was introduced 
“To amend and consolidate the Law relating to Copyright” United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Commons, vol 23, c1534. For an account of the social, political and economic milieu 
surrounding the enactment of the 1912 Act, see Atkinson, above n 16, 63-8. Also see United Kingdom, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 7 April 2011, vol 23 cc2587-663.  
29 Atkinson, above n 16, 89-91. Following from the prescriptive imperial model, and differentially to 
the 1905 Act it replaced, the 1912 Act exhaustively defined exceptions, which was also notable in 
comparison with the broader more illustrative method to be found in US ‘fair use’ model. See Robert 
Burrell and Allison Coleman, Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact Cambridge University Press, 
(2005), 249-260. Particularly at fn 41, where those authors note the lack of Australian debate of the fair 
dealing provisions in the 1912 Act; and at 259-260 for an overview of Copinger’s charting of 
subsequent development of the restrictive view of fair dealing under the 1911 Act. 
30 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 14 November 1911, vol 10, cc 113-66 
(Viscount Haldane: ‘The principle of fair dealing is a principle which the Courts have applied with the 
greatest care. Infringement of copyright cannot be allowed under disguise. All that is done here is to 
make a plain declaration of what the law is and to put all copyright works under the same wording.’) 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1911/nov/14/imperial-
copyright#S5LV0010P0_19111114_HOL_59. As subsequent authors note: “A common feature of 
debates on the reform of copyright law since at least 1911 is that [the UK] Parliament has shown a 
desire to reform the law within the framework set by earlier judicial decisions” – Burrell and Coleman, 
above n 27, 242. 
31 While the United Kingdom would replace its 1911 Act with its 1956 Act, the High Court of 
Australia later held that the former Act was still in force in Australia until the enactment of the 1968 
Act: Copyright Owners Reproduction Society Ltd v EMI (Australia) Pty Ltd (1958) 100 CLR 597, 603. 
32 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 40.  
33 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 41, 103A.  
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additions of the exceptions permitting reproductions for judicial proceedings, and one 
of fair dealing for the purpose of professional advice.35 
The 1968 Act was subject to scrutiny and amendment in the 1970s. In response to 
concerns that the inherent uncertainty of the fair dealing threshold meant copyright 
users were struggling to independently identify the boundaries of how much copying 
they were permitted to do,36 the Franki Committee recommended extending the 
definition of what was a ‘reasonable portion’ of copying by introducing set, 
quantifiable limits for the benefit of copiers.37 It was also recommended that the word 
‘private’ be removed from ‘private study’.38 These recommendations were 
subsequently incorporated into the 1968 Act.39 By the late 1970s it was the position in 
Australia that the public interests served by the fair dealing exceptions allowing 
research and study served were considered to be too important, too fundamental, to be 
replaced by a pay-per-use scheme. 
The current fair dealing exceptions are fundamental public interests, which the law 
recognises as transcending the limited monopoly of copyright on account of the 
public entitlement to reasonable access to copyright material.40 They are, in the broad 
context of this review, vested property rights, which are vested in the users of 
copyright works. These rights ensure for society as a whole that copyright’s grasp 
over ideas, information and culture is no stronger than that of the very public domain 
that copyright seeks to enrich. As such these rights must be appropriately protected. 
Implementing this submitter’s prior recommendations to IP 4641 would not alter the 
long established balance between creators, owners and users. What it would do is 
make a difference to the ordinary users, as it would enable proper guidance to be 
provided by the courts removed from the likelihood of the effects of owner abuse or 
their own ignorance that arise when fair dealing is left to the mercy of contractual 
negotiations. Such an amendment would also benefit Australia as a whole. The 
																																																																																																																																																														
34 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 42, 103B.  
35 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 43, 104. 
36 Copyright Law Committee on Reprographic Reproduction, Report of the Copyright Law Committee 
on Reprographic Reproduction (1976) [1.26] (‘Franki Committee Report’).  
37 Ibid [2.60]. Notably, however, these limits were not ‘maximums’, in the sense that they were merely 
included to act as a guide for users of copyright material. The person relying on the provision could, 
theoretically, exceed these limits and still receive the benefit of the fair dealing provision; depending, 
of course, on the application of the other factors relevant to the assessment of ‘fairness’. 
38 Ibid [1.45]. 
39 Copyright Amendment Bill (No 2) 1979 (Cth). See also Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright 
Amendment Bill (No 2) 1979 (Cth) 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/cab21979250/memo_0.html>. “Reasonable portion” 
was defined as follows: ‘Without limiting the meaning of the expression, the copying of not more than 
10 per cent of the number of pages or one chapter of a literary, dramatic or musical work is to be taken 
to be a reasonable portion of that work’. See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 40(5)-(7). 
40 Phonographic Performance Company of Australia Limited v Commonwealth of Australia (2012) 246 
CLR 561, [97]. 
41 Submission #67 dated 23 February 2015. 
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precedents established through this process, in particular as the courts consider the 
application of copyright law in the digital context, would enable the proper 
development of the copyright regime into our future. As Viscount Haldane noted 
“[t]he law of fair criticism and reproduction for the purposes of fair criticism is the 
work of the Courts”;42 and so it should remain. 
 
																																																								
42 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 14 November 1911, vol 10, cc 113-66 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1911/nov/14/imperial-
copyright#S5LV0010P0_19111114_HOL_59. 
